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' ONG-TERM interest rates in the United States rose steeply
from July 1965 through August 1966. Rates on long-term bonds
then declined through late October, erasing as much as a third of
their earlier advance. But most recently they have turned up again.
During the earlier period of advance, increases in rates ranged
up to 1% percentage points, and rate levels on good-quality issues
reached the highest point in 40 years. At these highs, rates ex-
ceeded 6 per cent on new high-grade corporate bonds, 7 per
cent on new investment-grade municipal bonds (after adjustment
to a tax-equivalent-yield basis), and IV2 per cent on conventional
mortgages in some parts of the country.
The upswing in rates was caused by a combination of factors.
Chief among these were mushrooming demands of businesses for
external financing, large Federal borrowing through agency securi-
ties and participation certificates, and a monetary policy that
exerted increasing restraint on growth in the supply of funds avail-
able to meet these demands.
Business demands for funds rose when outlays for plant and
equipment, inventories, and accelerated tax payments ran in-
creasingly ahead of the supply of internal funds. At the same
time, the combination of sharply rising private and governmental
expenditures pressed harder on the country's resource capabilities,
so that prices and wages began to rise faster. In these circum-
stances, the Federal Reserve gradually intensified its policy of
monetary restraint.
The counterpart of these developments in financial markets was




U.S. Govt. (20-year maturity)
Corporate Aaa (new issue)












+ .84 -.24 +.10 4.90
+ 1.40 -.38 +.30 5.90
+ 1.32 -.47 +.14 5.94
+ 1.14 n.a. n.a.
 26.60
n.a. Not available.
1 Tax equivalent value calculated for individuals in 36 per cent personal income
tax bracket.
 2 September figure, the latest available.
NOTE.—Changes are based on weekly averages except for FHA, which are based
on bid quotations for 1 day each month. See also notes to Chart 1.









sive worsening of investor expectations regarding the probable
course of securities prices, and a sharp increase in interest rates of
all kinds.
As interest rates rose, shifts also developed in patterns of finan-
cial saving as among financial intermediaries and market securi-
ties. This added to constraints on the availability of funds in certain
key markets, notably those for mortgages and State and local gov-
ernment securities.
Much of the decline in bond yields from late August to late
October represented a reversing of the sharp late-summer rate
increases that had immediately preceded the August highs. Market
developments in late summer were strongly influenced by expecta-
tions of large fall credit demands in a period when available funds
were expected to be restrained further. But in the early fall, events
did not bear out these expectations. In addition to administration
actions designed to reduce the pressure of Federal borrowing op-
erations on interest rates, total funds raised by private borrowers
declined. To some extent these lower demands for financing re-
flected supply constraints on funds and resources. In addition, they
apparently reflected a temporary drop in financing because of
INTEREST RATES in capital markets rise steeply after mid-1965
• With call protection.
Monthly averages. Yields on FHA-insuted mortgages are weighted averages of private second-
ary market prices of certain new-house mortgages converted to annual yield—25-year mortgages
through June 1961; 30-year mortgages thereafter. Yields on State and local govt. Aaa bonds are
from Moody's Investors Service, adjusted to tax equivalent basis assuming 36 per cent individual
income tax rate; on corporate bonds, yields are weighted averages of new publicly offered bonds
rated Aaa, Aa, and A by Moody's Investors Service and adjusted to an Aaa basis (beginning
January 1966, includes only issues with 5-year call protection). Thin-portion lines for FHA-
Insured mortgages indicate periods of adjustment to changes in FHA ceiling on contractual
rates; break for corporate new Issues indicates no eligible offerings.
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previous anticipatory borrowing and postponements of borrowing
prompted by expectations that interest rates would decline further.
Most recently, a resurgence of demands for long-term funds has
contributed to the recent upturn in bond yields.
USERS OF
The primary demand factor accounting for the steep rise in long-
LONG-TERM FUNDS . • , ^ ^ ^ • ...
term rates after mid-1965 was the sheer size and sustained in-
tensity of business demands for external financing.
Businesses. Needs of nonfinancial corporations for external
financing expanded primarily because of the record gap which
opened up between capital outlays and internal sources of funds
(chiefly depreciation allowances and retained earnings). After
late 1964, and especially after mid-1965, dollar outlays for fixed
CAPITAL OUTLAYS of corporations rise more than
their internal funds particularly since mid-1965
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Flow of funds data for nonfinancial corporate business. Quarterly
totals at seasonally adjusted annual rates. Outlays comprise
fixed investment and change in inventories. Funds comprise
profits, less profits-tax accruals and dividend payments, plus
capital consumption allowances. Third quarter 1966, preliminary.
assets and inventories increased much more than the dollar flow
of internal funds (Chart 2). During the first three quarters of
1966, such outlays exceeded internal funds by more than $13
billion (annual rate) or 23 per cent. In the same periods of 1960
and 1957, the excess amounted to 17 per cent. Thus the gap
this year has been unusually wide, even when compared with
crests in previous expansion periods.
In addition to their enlarged capital outlays, corporations ex-
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panded their external financing to cover extensions of credit to
customers and to meet expanded tax payments required under the
revised schedules for prepayment of Federal income and withheld
taxes. As a result, total funds raised by nonfinancial corporations
in credit and equity markets, which had totaled $14 billion in
1964 and $19 billion in 1965, rose to an annual rate of more than
$25 billion in the first three quarters of 1966.
Almost all of the rise in external financing requirements from
1964 to 1965 had been accommodated at commercial banks
(Chart 3). Hence, net funds raised in security markets during
1965 were no larger than the $5.4 billion raised in 1964. In 1966,
on the other hand, while corporate borrowing at banks was at a
record rate in the second quarter when accelerated tax payments
were due, the total of such borrowing for the first three quarters as
a whole was slightly below the 1965 annual rate. Thus, all of the
year-to-year increase in corporate external financing for the three-
quarter period was centered in securities markets and the total
of such offerings rose to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of more
than $13 billion. This striking expansion in issues of nonfinancial
corporations exerted strong upward pressures on long-term rates,
which were offset to only a small extent by a reduction in the
volume of offerings by financial corporations.
CHART 3
1966 spurt in EXTERNAL FINANCING by corporations reflects expansion in security issues
Flow of funds data for nonfinancial corporate business. Quar-
terly and 9-month totals at seasonally adjusted annual rates.
Third quarter 1966, preliminary.
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Had U.S. corporations and their foreign affiliates not issued
more than $1 billion of securities in overseas markets during this
period—chiefly to help implement the Commerce Department's
program of voluntary restraints on direct investment abroad—
some part of this total would undoubtedly have been financed in
U.S. securities markets and would have added further to upward
rate pressures in this country.
U.S. Government. In contrast with the upsurge in business finan-
ing, net funds borrowed by the Federal Government showed an
increase of less than $ 1 billion during the fiscal year beginning at
mid-1965. This figure understates the demand pressures of Fed-
eral operations on long-term interest rates, however, for $3 billion
of Federal cash requirements in fiscal 1966 were accommodated
through the sale of certificates of participation in pools of out-
standing Federal loans.


























1 Pool sales enter the Federal budget as negative expenditures and are not a part
of net cash borrowing.
2 Federal agency debt offerings are a part of net Federal cash borrowing.
Substitution of such "pool" sales for regular Treasury cash bor-
rowing put greater upward pressure on long-term interest rates
than would have resulted from an equivalent volume of ordinary
Treasury issues. Not only was the market for participation certifi-
cates less well developed, but also the average maturity of such
certificates was longer than for issues offered in other recent Treas-
ury borrowing operations.
Moreover, $1.8 billion of these pool sales were concentrated in
the second quarter of 1966—at a time when the volume of debt
offerings by Federal agencies was also rising steeply. Large net
offerings of agency issues developed when weakness in the home
mortgage and housing markets added abruptly to private demands
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for funds from the Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association. This augmented the needs of
these institutions for security market financing of their own. In
the second quarter the combined net volume of both agency
securities and participation certificates amounted to $16 billion
at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. Even though $12 billion (an-
nual rate) of regular short-term Treasury debt was being retired
in that period, interest rates on agency issues and on participa-
tion certificates rose more steeply than those on other types of
securities.
The projected Federal budget program calling for large addi-
tional pool sales in fiscal 1967 continued to exert an important
impact on market expectations until early September. At that
point, the President—as part of a broad program designed to re-
duce upward pressures on interest rates—announced that pool
sales would be discontinued until market conditions were more
favorable. On the other hand, with Federal cash outlays rising
more rapidly because of the Vietnamese war, estimates of fourth-
quarter Treasury cash borrowing needs rose to the highest level
since 1959 and, during the late summer and early fall, reinforced
market expectations of further general increases in rates.
Others. Both of the other two major types of borrowers in capi-
tal markets—State and local governments, and households seek-
ing mortgage financing for homes—reduced their financing in the
first three quarters of 1966 relative to 1965. The impetus for this
cut-back by both types of borrowers came chiefly from restraints
imposed on the supply of funds. It should be noted that since multi-
family housing and commercial construction are undertaken by
businesses, financing of such construction is included in the totals
for nonfinancial corporations already discussed.
While State and local government needs for funds may have
been moderated to some extent by unexpectedly large tax receipts,
over-all State and local outlays have continued to grow. Thus the
volume of their financing appears to have been affected most
strongly by the high costs of borrowing and by the tendency for
market rates to exceed rate ceilings imposed on borrowers by
statute or bond authorizations.
During the latter half of 1965 home builders were expecting
some rise in demands. While they anticipated no major revival,
the abrupt cut-back of savings flows in 1966 to the types of lenders
most active in home financing sharply curtailed the financial means
for making these demands effective.
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Even before the December 1965 Federal Reserve discount rate
action, a series of events including escalation of the war in Viet-
nam, the rapid further move of the economy toward full employ-
ment, and the sharp expansion of business demands for credit had
all been widely interpreted in financial circles as presaging a period
of intensified monetary restraint and higher interest rates. This
combination of fact and forecast had set off a sizable—and partly
anticipatory—general advance in rates even before the increase
in the discount rate.
SELECTED FINANCIAL INDICATORS level off








Monthly averages of daily figures, except total bank credit
and negotiable CD's which are last Wednesday of month figures
(except June 30 and Dec. 31). All data seasonally adjusted ex-
cept negotiable CD's. Latest data plotted, September.
Increased monetary restraint during 1966 reflected itself not
only in a further rise in interest rates and tightening of other credit
terms, which were also a result of expanded credit demands, but
in changes in other financial variables as well. For example, the
supply of nonborrowed reserves at member banks and the money
stock both leveled off in the spring, and in the early fall both
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measures tended downward. Total bank credit continued to grow
until summer, but the funds financing this growth came wholly
from increases in time deposits. Some of these funds in turn were
bid away from nonbank intermediaries, thus adding further to
constraints on other forms of credit expansion.
Since August, bank credit has contracted slightly. A major
factor contributing to this change has been the net run-off of
large denomination negotiable time certificates of deposit (CD's)
at banks. Contraction of such CD's after mid-August reflected in-
creases in rates on market instruments, which put CD's limited to
the 5Vi per cent ceiling rate at a competitive disadvantage.
SPREAD OF The spread of credk restraint during 1965 and 1966 from the
CREDIT RESTRAINT commerciai banking system and the money market—where Fed-
eral Reserve actions exert their initial impact—to other types of
financial institutions and to long-term markets has been charac-
teristic of periods of monetary stringency. But the relative steep-
ness of the rise in long-term rates after mid-1965 developed in part
because of the particular institutional changes that had occurred
during the preceding years of extended monetary ease. In that ear-
lier period, interest rate relationships had encouraged an unusually
rapid growth of savings at depositary-type financial intermediaries,
particularly the commercial banks. Because a large part of these
essentially liquid savings were then loaned by the intermediaries
in long-term markets, long-term rates tended to be held down even
though short-term rates rose.
During 1965 and 1966, as rates on market securities rose faster
than those on claims at depositary-type institutions, savings growth
at financial intermediaries slowed down. As a result, flows of insti-
tutional funds into long-term uses shrank, and long-term rates rose
more relative to short-term than they had in periods of monetary
restraint during the 1950's.
Bank response to monetary restraint. The combination of heavy
business demands for credit and a more restrictive monetary policy
exerted growing pressures on bank liquidity positions during 1965
and 1966. With business demands so large and business loans so
profitable, however, bankers were naturally reluctant to turn down
long-standing customers, and in many instances they could not
do so because of prior commitments. To satisfy as much of the
business demand as possible, bankers attempted to augment their
business lending capacity by cutting back acquisitions of other
assets and by continuing to bid aggressively for savings.
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During the first three quarters of 1966, they liquidated $4.5
billion of U.S. Government securities at a seasonally adjusted an-
nual rate; their net acquisitions of municipal securities dropped
to one-third the volume acquired in the comparable quarters of
1965; increases in loans to other types of borrowers—such as
securities and finance companies—were cut back, in some cases
drastically; and ultimately, in the face of continuing demands,
many banks rationed credit to businesses. While bank extensions
of mortgage credit held up surprisingly well in the first half of
the year, they too dropped below the 1965 rate, particularly in the
third quarter. Likewise bank extensions of consumer credit
dropped below the 1965 rate in all quarters.
On the liability side, bankers attempted to match the competi-
tion of market rates with rate increases of their own on time de-
posits. In the spring they raised rates paid on large CD's to the
5
l/i per cent maximum first permitted by regulation in December
1965. And later, without reducing the rate, they shortened the
maturities of new CD's to as little as 30 days. In addition, to
buttress their savings flows further, they turned more actively to
the promotion of smaller-denomination forms of consumer-type
time deposits. Finally, banks with foreign branches added more
than $2 billion to their U.S. funds by drawing on dollars acquired
by their branches in the Euro-dollar market.
As liquidation of securities, expanded competition for savings,
enlarged money market borrowing, and repatriation of Euro-
dollars added to the cost of bank funds, bankers took advantage
of the heavy credit demands to raise their own loan charges. The
prime rate on short-term business loans was increased on four
occasions—from 4V2 per cent in November 1965 to 6 per cent
by August 1966. And some other loan charges were raised even
more steeply. For example, by August some users of bank credit
for stock market purposes were paying as much as 8 per cent.
Impact on securities markets. Bank operations thus had a double-
barreled impact on interest rates in bond markets. On the one
hand, with constraints on the growth in total bank credit forcing
banks both to ration business loans and to raise their costs, the
volume of business demands seeking accommodation in securities
markets more than doubled relative to the first three quarters of
1965 (Chart 3). At the same time, with fewer bank funds avail-
able for investment, a rising share of security offerings had to be
absorbed by other types of investors. The significance of this
change was most noticeable in the market for State and local
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CHART 5
government securities where bank takings as a share of net growth
in securities outstanding dropped from more than 75 per cent in
the first half of 1965 to about 40 per cent in the like period of
1966 and to only 3 per cent in the quarter ending with Sep-
tember. Similarly, in markets for Federal agency securities and
participation certificates, the rate advance accompanying the large
second-quarter expansion in net offerings would obviously have
been less if the banks had had more funds to invest.
NONFINANCIAL PUBLIC shows preference for






Flow of funds annual data except for 1966, which is an average
of the first three quarters at a seasonally adjusted annual rate.
Nonfinancial public includes households, all nonfinancial busi-
ness, and State and jocal governments. Fjows through deposi-
tary-type intermediaries are changes in time and savings de-
posits (including negotiable CD's) at commercial banks, de-
posits in mutual savings banks, and share capital at savings
and loan associations and credit unions. Flows through insur-
ance and pension fund intermediaries include reserves of life
insurance companies and private pension funds, plus employee
retirement funds of State and local governments. Flows through
market represent direct acquisition of securities by nonfinancial
public. Total flows include demand deposits and currency.
In corporate bond markets upward pressures on interest rates
were created not only by the large over-all expansion in net debt
offerings, already noted, but also by an increase in the proportion
of new issues taking the form of public offerings. Dollar for dollar,
public offerings generate stronger direct pressures on long-term
rates than private placements do. While commitments on issues
placed privately with institutional investors were large in late
1965 and early 1966, they dropped off sharply as the year
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progressed, reflecting a growing constriction in the availability of
investment funds at life insurance companies. The volume of bonds
offered publicly by nonfinancial corporations in the first three
quarters of 1966 was thus almost 40 per cent larger than in the
like period of 1965.
The combination of greatly expanded security offerings, re-
duced bank takings, and growing constraints on new commitment
activity at life companies could be resolved in only one way—
namely, by increases in long-term rates large enough to draw funds
directly from the nonfinancial public into the securities markets.
The resulting redirection of savings flows was the largest experi-
enced since 1959—the last preceding period of monetary restraint
and high rates on market securities (Chart 5).
Competition among intermediaries. Increased buying of high-
yielding market securities by the nonfinancial public occurred
largely at the expense of depositary-type financial savings.
Although all types of institutions attracting such savings have
experienced a shrinkage of their inflows during 1966 (Chart 6),
Among depositary-type institutions,
SAVINGS FLOWS down most at S & L's
CHART 6
COMMERCIAL BANKS
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSNS.
MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKS
Flow of funds annual data except for 1966, which is an average
of the first three quarters at a seasonally adjusted annual rate.
Commercial bank flows include negotiable CD's but exclude de-
mand deposits and currency.
over the first 7 months the shrinkage occurred mainly at savings
and loan associations and mutual savings banks. While commer-
cial banks also dropped somewhat behind the year-earlier growth
rate in that period, 1965 had been their record year.
The greater relative success of commercial banks in competing
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for savings during this period reflected more aggressive efforts to
match rising market rates by increasing rates paid on both large
CD's and consumer-type time deposits. Banks, with assets that are
more diversified and of shorter average maturity than those of the
savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks, found it
easier to match higher costs for deposits with higher interest earn-
ings. Moreover, banks were more successful than the other two
groups in differentiating the types of claims they offered. As a
result, the maximum interest rate paid by banks usually applied
to a relatively small share of their total liabilities.
Finally, the freedom of the savings and loan industry to com-
pete was further constrained by the efforts of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board to limit increases in dividend rates and borrow-
ing by its member associations. These restraints were part of a con-
tinuing policy designed to achieve a sounder basis for growth than
had occurred at some associations earlier in the 1960's, when they
had promoted high dividend rates and had greatly increased bor-
rowings from the home loan banks.




































1 Excludes CD's at weekly reporting banks.
NOTE.—Net growth of share capital at all insured savings and loan associations,
savings deposits at mutual savings banks, and time and savings deposits at commercial
banks as percentage of amounts outstanding at end of preceding year. August-October
rates are based on preliminary October data for S & L's and mutuals.
Because savings and loan associations and mutual savings
banks are the major lenders that finance homes, the sharp further
shrinkage of their net savings flows—along with added pressures
on the more diversified commercial bank and life insurance com-
pany lenders—led to an abrupt tightening of the home mortgage
market and a steep rise in mortgage rates. During the second and
third quarters, commitments to make new mortgage loans dropped
to a fraction of their early pace, and as the backlog of prior loan
Federal Reserve Bulletin: November 1966INTEREST RATES IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 1587
commitments was drawn down, housing starts declined sharply
to less than their recession low of 1960.
By the summer, questions of social and economic priority were
being posed by the contrast between the abrupt squeeze on
home financing and the continued strong support being pro-
vided by bank credit to the business capital boom. In these cir-
cumstances, even though further advances in short-term market in-
terest rates began to put CD rates at a competitive disadvantage,
the maximum permissible deposit interest rates set by the Board's
Regulation Q were not raised—as they had been on four earlier
occasions in the 1960's when market rates had risen close to such
ceilings. Also, when Congress acted to provide the necessary addi-
tional statutory flexibility, the maximum permissible rate payable
on bank time deposits of less than $100,000 was rolled back from
5Vz to 5 per cent. This change was part of a coordinated set
of rate actions by Federal supervisory agencies designed to stop
the escalation of rate competition for savings among depositary-
type intermediaries.
As the table shows, growth of total time deposits at banks did
slow down rather abruptly from August through October. While
most of this slow-down was attributable to the net liquidation of
large CD's, growth of consumer-type deposits at banks also slowed.
Impact on life insurance companies. As has already been noted,
changes in credit availability at life insurance companies played
a part in the spread of monetary restraint. Because of their con-
tractual character, net savings flows to life insurance companies
were not greatly affected by the intensified competition for savings
created by high yields on market securities. As Chart 5 suggests,
the relative insensitivity of contractual savings flows to cyclical
swings in interest rates is typical, and was also evident in the 1959
period of high rates.
Some life insurance companies have, nevertheless, found them-
selves with smaller than expected supplies of loan funds this year,
because changes in interest rate relationships have caused their
gross cash flows to fall short of anticipated levels. As a rule, in-
surance companies are able to predict their basic cash inflows with
a high degree of accuracy. But this year, prepayments of mort-
gages dropped off with the rise in mortgage rates and the reduced
turnover of existing housing. Withdrawals of policy proceeds that
had been left on deposit with life companies (for a fixed rate of re-
turn) increased as rates on alternative types of financial assets rose.
And policy loans—which most life companies are committed by
Federal Reserve Bulletin: November 19661588 FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN • NOVEMBER 1966
contract to make on the cash surrender value of their policies at
rates no higher than 5 per cent—accelerated sharply, thereby pre-
empting an unexpectedly large share of the gross cash flow.
As a result of the smaller than expected gross cash flow, some
companies had a serious liquidity problem. This reflected two
general characteristics of life insurance company operations,
which have developed over the years: (1) Normally accurate
predictions of cash flows have encouraged these companies to
invest most of their available funds in illiquid, high yielding
assets; and (2) their gross cash flows are so large that most com-
panies commit a large share of funds in advance.
During the 1961-64 period when the supply of long-term funds
was large relative to demands, insurance companies had sub-
stantially increased the share of anticipated cash flow being
committed in advance. Late in 1965 and early in 1966 when long-
term rates first began their steep rise, this back-log of outstanding
commitments was expanded still further to take advantage of the
higher yields.
But as 1966 progressed and it became clear that gross flows
to life insurance companies were falling below projections, some
companies had to resort to unusual actions in order to be in a
position to meet take-downs of their outstanding commitments.
Among other things they drew on their limited cash balances,
liquidated securities, rescheduled acquisitions of mortgages from
their servicing agents, and borrowed from banks. At the same time
they began to stretch out the timing of new loan commitments,
arranging for deferred delivery of a substantial part of the funds.
When policy loan increases in particular continued their sharp
rise, some companies most severely affected stopped making new
loan commitments for the time being.
RT5CENX
During the third quarter spreading realization of the strength of
LOPMK prospective credit demands and of the growing effects of credit
restraint created general market expectations of more sharply
rising interest rates. This change in market psychology, together
with the actions it both reflected and encouraged, led to an exag-
gerated late summer upsurge in bond yields (Chart 7).
Large city banks in particular were confronted with the pros-
pect of a sizable net run-off of their near-dated CD maturities, as
market rates rose. This prospect, occurring as it did at a time
when new loan commitments were also being steeply curtailed at
some life insurance companies, seemed to pose the possibility of
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a serious imbalance between available funds and fall credit de-
mands.
In these circumstances, a variety of precautionary actions were
undertaken by lenders and borrowers alike. A number of money-
market banks attempted to anticipate expected net September
run-offs of their CD's by liquidating large blocks of municipal
securities in the secondary market. But they found it difficult to
attract buyers for their securities even at sharply increased yields.
At the same time, a number of large corporations moved to float
new security issues in the capital markets in what is usually a
slack period of financing. Their purpose was to insure coverage of
future needs before the cost and availability of funds tightened
further. As a result, the August volume of corporate bonds offered
in the public market ballooned to $ 1.1 billion, the largest volume
on record for a single month.
August-October decline. When events failed to confirm the ex-
treme expectations of an early fall credit-availability crisis, the
steep August advance in rates was reversed. Some of the roll-back
reflected changes in administration policies in response to the
August upsurge of rates. For example, President Johnson's request
for special legislation to help moderate the business capital boom,
along with his announcements that nonmilitary Federal spending
would be cut, that the volume of anticipated Federal agency bor-
rowing and pool sales would be reduced, and that further tax
Most of the SHARP RATE ADVANCES in late summer of '66 have been erased
CHART 7




U.S. GOVERNMENT 120 yearj
Weekly averages except State and local govt, which are Thursday figures. Yields on new cor-
porate issues for offerings with 5-year call protection only. See also notes to Chart 1.
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action would be requested if needed to balance increases in spend-
ing for the Vietnamese war, all helped to calm the earlier fears
of impending crisis. Fears were further alleviated when the Federal
Reserve announced that its credit would be available to help banks
adjust to reserve losses arising from time deposit withdrawals.
Following these early September announcements, evidence
suggesting that economic and financial developments in the pri-
vate sector might also not be living up to earlier market expecta-
tions reinforced the general rate decline. While bank credit expan-
sion was small and CD's at banks experienced a net run-off of more
than %2Vi billion from mid-August to the end of October, the drain
was a smaller share of total CD maturities than many had feared—
indicating that banks were able to encourage investors to hold
CD's on other bases than strict comparison of rate spreads. More-
over, as yields on short-term Treasury bills declined, rates paid on
30-day CD maturities became competitive again.
Equally important, during September and October business
capital market financing was not as large as in preceding months,
even though business loan growth dropped to about one-third the
rate earlier in the year. This evidence together with some other
signs of a less ebullient economy raised questions among market
participants whether private spending might be tapering off cycli-
cally. With questions also being raised whether spending to sup-
port the U.S. commitment in Vietnam might rise less rapidly in
1967, market expectations about interest rates shifted, and some
investors began to position bonds in anticipation of further rate
declines.
Recent rate advance. Around the end of October bond yields
started to reverse their course again, and by mid-November they
had recovered a sizable part of their earlier fall declines—as was
shown in the table on page 1575. The upturn was attributable
chiefly to a resurgence of business demands for long-term funds in
a period when the availability of bank credit was significantly lim-
ited. In addition, State and local government demands for funds
expanded, and large borrowings by the U.S. Government in short-
term markets continued to exert general upward pressures on rates.
Finally, interest rate expectations were apparently being affected
by an increase in the odds that market participants were placing on
the chance of a further offering of Federal participation certificates
and a decrease in the odds being placed on a Federal tax increase
early in 1967.
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